Solyaris

Vietnam’s Cam Ranh Bay is one of Asia’s finest deep-water ports, a fact known well not just to the Vietnamese but to the host of nations who have at one time or another occupied this South China Sea prize.  France, Japan, Russia and the United States have all at one time or another been based here, each successive occupying power making improvements to the Bay’s facilities.

The port was recognized as a strategic asset by the French immediately upon their arrival during their colonization of Indochina, and was subsequently used by the Russians (during the Russo-Japanese War) and Japanese (after they occupied Vichy French Asian territories during World War II).  The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers built upon the World-War Two era facilities during the Vietnam War, including the construction of a massive airbase in addition to the port.  Cam Ranh Bay served as the primary entry point for American supplies and troops during the conflict.  The base was turned over to the South Vietnamese government in 1972 and was overrun by North Vietnamese forces in 1975.

In 1979 Vietnam, seeking to counterbalance China, with whom relations had become deeply sour, granted the Soviet Union access to Cam Ranh Bay in an agreement slated to last until 2004.  They remained there until 2001, balking at the higher fees Vietnam then began to demand.  While there, according to an article in Contemporary Southeast Asia, the Russians added five new piers (for a total of 7), two dry docks, nuclear submarine shelters, fuel and weapons storage facilities (visible in the satellite imagery), as well as barracks, roads, a power station and a runway extension (“Cam Ranh Bay:  Past Imperfect, Future Conditional,” Ian Story & Carlyle Thayer, Dec. 2001).  Much of these improvements have most likely fallen into disrepair, although some aspects more so than others.

Since the Russians left the base has remained mostly empty and its future open to much speculation.  Every so often since then the Vietnamese have hinted to different national delegations that they are amenable to granting access, although to date the port remains vacant.  The airfield has been opened up to some commercial traffic (in what may be a sign of things to come).

There are only three powers with naval forces in the region sizeable enough to make access to such a facility worthwhile – China, India, and the United States.  (Russia is presumably not interested, having just left, and Japan’s history and defense-oriented policy rule out overseas basing for the present.)

A fourth scenario – the most likely in the opinion of many -  is that Vietnam opens the bay as a commercial port, perhaps granting visitation rights to all three of the above.  If Solyaris were to offer odds, it would place them as follows:  China – 100:1; US 50:1; India 10:1; open to commerce: 1:1.

China is not likely to be considered an acceptable candidate for a Cam Ranh Bay deal due to historical tensions and current disputes.  A long standing land-border dispute was only settled last year, and both countries lay claim to the same resource-rich portions of the South China Sea.

The United States likewise has much historical baggage that would make it difficult to secure any sort of basing deal with Vietnam.  Further, it doesn’t recognize Vietnam’s claims to the Spratly Islands or other places disputed with China and so its presence back in Vietnam is unlikely to shift the balance of power in a manner that country would find significantly advantageous.  Vietnam does occasionally allude to US access to the Bay in private talks, suggesting it is within the realm of possibility – albeit a very distant one – that the US returns.

India has a much better history with Vietnam than either China or the United States, a growing Navy, and like Vietnam is wary of China’s naval ambitions.  Further, it would welcome a base in the South China Sea as a counter to China’s Indian Ocean presence, straddling India with a base in Gwadar (Pakistan) and “friendly” ports in Myanmar.  In the words of the Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, “India needs Vietnam in strategic terms as a spear in the Chinese underbelly to counter the threatening Beijing-Islamabad-Rangoon entente now taking shape against New Delhi” (quoted in “Cam Ranh Bay…” article mentioned above).  Vietnam and India both maintain Russian equipment and this has been a convenient common ground in several recent defense partnerships between the two countries.  There is also a history of nuclear cooperation and officer exchange programs.

Despite this, the fourth option (opening Cam Ranh Bay to private commerce) seems like it would be the best from Vietnam’s point of view for the following reasons:

• Money.  Both for its own benefit and in response to public pressure from within – regional authorities are pressuring Vietnamese leadership to open the port to commerce for the money it will bring.
• Flexibility.  Doing so will allow Vietnam to continue to balance China and the United States (and any other regional powers) by granting visitation rights on an individual, non-committal basis.
• Diplomacy.  Doing so will have the extra benefit of not appearing to “take sides.”  Vietnam is pursuing closer relations, despite its differences, with both China and the United States.
• Security.  Connecting this port to the broader South China Sea lines of communication gives everyone using it an interest in maintaining the status quo.  Further, America seeks “places, not bases” in South East Asia:  agreements with countries to use their ports rather than sovereign, U.S.-run facilities (like Subic Bay).  This option would still be on the table for the U.S. if Vietnam opened to port to commercial traffic.
• Politics.  By retaining sovereignty over the Bay the Vietnamese leadership wouldn’t have to worry about popular backlash granting rights to a foreign power would likely produce.

Or if you’re a fan of Dune (and what geopolitical quandary can’t Dune guide us in?) the above can be succinctly summarized from the following:

"They’re sending a new flag up on the tall ship," the watcher said. "The flag is yellow . . . with a black and red circle in the center."

"There’s a subtle piece of business," Paul said. "The CHOAM Company flag."

"It’s the same as the flag at the other ships," the Fedaykin guard said.

"I don’t understand," Stilgar said.

"A subtle piece of business indeed," Gurney said. "Had he sent up the Atreides banner, he’d have had to live by what that meant. Too many observers about. He could’ve signaled with the Harkonnen flag on his staff — a flat declaration that’d have been. But, no — he sends up the CHOAM rag. He’s telling the people up there . . . " Gurney pointed toward space. " . . . where the profit is. He’s saying he doesn’t care if it’s an Atreides here or not."

-Frank Herbert, Dune

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